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C. Michael Aho*
More Bilateral Trade Agreements
Would be a Blunder: What the
New President Should Do
Introduction
Bilateral trade agreements, unfortunately, are once more in vogue.
Frustrated with protracted negotiations under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),I the Reagan Administration proposed
negotiating a series of bilateral trade agreements with major U.S. trad-
ing partners. Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield and for-
mer Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd have both suggested that the
U.S. andJapan should negotiate a bilateral trade treaty. Senator Baucus
promotes the idea in an accompanying Article.2 The recently concluded
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement3 has provided a major
impetus to the advocacy of bilateral agreements, and is significant as a
signal that trade liberalization is still possible and that international
negotiations can still bear fruit.4
Proponents of bilateral accords fail to see, however, that such
agreements could increase trade frictions and eventually fragment the
world trade system. Beyond the unique case of Canada (and maybe
Mexico sometime in the next century), further bilateral agreements are
likely to produce the same disastrous effects on world trade as an overt
policy of protectionism.
* Director of Economic Studies and Director of the International Trade Project,
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (5), (6),
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATr].
2. See Baucus, A New Trade Strategy: The Case for Bilateral Agreements, 22 CORNELL
INT'L LJ. 1 (1989).
3. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Communication from the Presi-
dent, H.R. Doc. No. 100-216, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). For a comprehensive
discussion of the agreement, see International Trade-United States-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988), and in 29 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 572 (1988).
4. C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, AFTER REAGAN: CONFRONTING THE CHANGED WORLD
ECONOMY 94 (1988).
22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25 (1989)
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This Article advocates continued reliance on multilateralism in
United States trade policy. Part I sets the political backdrop. Part II
explores the key concepts of the GATT and their vital importance in
world trade. Part III explains how a move toward a trade policy favoring
bilateral agreements would be a deleterious move away from the GATT.
Part IV explores and rejects the most talked about potential bilateral
agreement-a United States-Japan accord. Finally, in Part V, this Article
proposes a strategy for President Bush that includes a strong reliance on
multilateralism as the cornerstone of U.S. trade policy. Such a policy
should include U.S. pressure abroad to revamp and enforce the GATT
and an active presidential role in forming trade policy at home.
I. The Political Backdrop
The impetus for bilateral trade agreements grows out of substantial con-
gressional frustration with the Reagan Administration's trade policy and
with its lack of progress in solving trade problems. Despite its free trade
rhetoric, U.S. trade policy fundamentally changed under the Reagan
Administration toward a more tit-for-tat, protectionist stance. 5
Unprecedented trade deficits and private sector complaints
spawned unprecedented administrative and legislative action on trade in
the past four years. In September, 1985, after four years in which the
Reagan Administration repeatedly labeled the trade deficit a sign of eco-
nomic strength, the Administration changed course and began vigorous
if not always effective action against allegedly unfair practices by foreign
States and firms. It initiated over a dozen unfairness complaints under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 against countries accused of main-
taining barriers to U.S. exports. 6 The Administration negotiated a car-
tel-like semiconductor agreement with Japan and then applied sanctions
against Japan for allegedly violating the agreement.7 According to then
Treasury Secretary James Baker III, the Reagan Administration has pro-
vided more import relief than any of its predecessors in the past fifty
years.8 Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress passed (over initial objections
from the Reagan Administration) a 1000-page trade reform bill,9
unprecedented in scope and scale.
5. Id. at 83-84.
6. Under the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1982), the President may
respond to unfair trade practices by imposing import duties and restrictions. Under
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107, the U.S. Trade Representative has the power to enforce this provision under
presidential approval.
7. Semiconductor Agreement, Sept. 2, 1986, United States-Japan, - U.S.T. -
T.I.A.S. No. - (numbers not yet assigned), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1409 (1986). See
Hirsh, International Trade Agreement Between the Government ofJapan and the Government of
the United States of America Concerning Trade in Semiconductor Patents, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J.
175 (1987).
8. Address by James Baker III, Institute for International Economics (Sept. 14,
1987). C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 84.
9. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107.
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Sentiment is growing for the United States to abandon its tradi-
tional multilateral approach to trade and to pursue a more active trade
policy, simultaneously pursuing bilateral and regional agreements with
like-minded countries.' 0 Others, like Congressman Gephardt, urge the
United States to adopt unilaterally a tit-for-tat trade policy, retaliating
against alleged unfair trade practices or against countries with persistent
surpluses.' How Congress and the new Administration will implement
the 1988 trade bill remains to be seen.
II. The Case for Multilateral Trade Policy
In the years following World War II, the GATT arose as the primary
agreement regulating international trade. 12 The cornerstone support-
ing both political and economic arguments for the GATT is the most-
favored-nation principle ("MFN").' 3 Unconditional MFN requires that
one nation agree to "extend to another [nation] the most favorable
trade concessions it [the former] has granted, or may grant, to any third
country" in some other future or existing agreement, regardless of
whether the latter nation is giving the former nation any future conces-
sions in return.' 4 This principle was crucial to the GATT at its incep-
tion and remains compelling as a guiding concept today.
The arguments for unconditional MFN in the GATT fall into two
categories, economic and political, with some overlap between the
two.' 5 The economic arguments center on efficiency. 16 States applying
unconditional MFN do not discriminate among supply sources. This
minimizes distortions in the market because imports come from the low-
est-cost source. Unconditional MFN also promotes overall trade liberal-
ization, since each party to the GATT opens its markets equally to all
other member-States. 17 Finally, unconditional MFN is simple to admin-
ister; transaction costs at the border are significantly reduced.' 8
The political arguments for unconditional MFN emphasize its ten-
10. See Baucus, supra note 2, at 7.
11. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1988, at Al, coT. 4; N.Y. Times, March 15, 1988, at D2,
col. 3.
12. The GATT was originally created as the international trade rules for the pro-
posed International Trade Organization ("ITO"). The ITO, intended to comple-
ment the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction, was never ratified. The GATT survived, however, and became the
central international agreement pertaining to trade. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAW OF GATT 2-3 (1969).
13. See generally R. SNYDER, THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE (1948); J. JACK-
SON, supra note 12, at 249-59.
14. Hufbauer, Shelton-Erb & Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-
Favored-Nation Principle, 12 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59 (1980).
15. Keohane, Reciprocity in International Relations, 40 INT'L ORGANIZATION 1 (1986).
16. Hufbauer, Should Unconditional MFN Be Revived, Retired or Recast?, in GATT AT
THE CROSSROADS-ISSUES IN WORLD TRADE POLICY 36-38 (R. Snape ed. 1986).
17. C. AHO &J. ARONSON, TRADE TALKS-AMERICA BETrER LISTEN! 120 (1985).
18. Keohane, supra note 15, at 12.
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dency to reduce tension among nations.1 9 From an international polit-
ical viewpoint, MFN fosters sovereign equality among nations and
guarantees newcomers access to international markets. 20 The automatic
extension of trade-liberalizing measures to others reduces friction and
disputes. 2 1 In contrast, discriminatory arrangements can increase mis-
understandings and disputes among different trade groupings or cause
resentment on the part of outsiders.2 2 Discriminatory treatment also
increases the probability that trade will be used as a weapon of foreign
policy. 23
From a domestic political viewpoint, discriminatory restrictions are
difficult to remove because they create vested interests in exporting as
well as importing countries. For example, both protected domestic tex-
tile producers and supplying firms in other countries that hold quota
licenses find discriminatory restrictions to their benefit.
Finally, MFN decreases the legal and legislative burdens of treating
different countries unequally. Discrimination often results in domestic
laws being applied differently to imports from various origins. 24 Sepa-
rate national agreements increase the work of elected officials in nations,
like the United States, where agreements have to be ratified by legisla-
tors. Legislative action on separate agreements also opens up the possi-
bility of domestic political bargaining and log rolling which could
undermine the original intentions of a given agreement. 25
Although unconditional MFN is theoretically the centerpiece of the
GATT system, that system also includes agreements involving condi-
tional MFN treatment. Conditional MFN requires a reciprocal agree-
ment between two nations granting favorable trade treatment. For
example, State A extends to State B the same trade concessions it
granted State C only if State B reciprocates with concessions equivalent
to those given by C to A.26 Conditional MFN can be used to expand
trade, but because only a limited number of countries may join restric-
tive agreements, conditional MFN is inferior to unconditional MFN as a
trade policy.
Some of the Tokyo Round non-tariff-barrier codes contain condi-
tional features. 27 For example, only firms from countries that are signa-
tories of the government procurement code may bid on the government
19. Id. at 27. Hufbauer, supra note 16, at 36.
20. Keohane, supra note 15, at 23.
21. Id.
22. See generally G. PATTERSON, DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE-THE
POLICY ISSUES 1945-66 (1966).
23. C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 120. See also G. PATTERSON, supra note
22, at 271-317.
24. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE: 1986 REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (1986).
25. C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 120.
26. Keohane, supra note 15, at 4. For a discussion of exceptions to unconditional
MFN under the GAIT, see J.JACRSON, supra note 12, at 264-72.
27. Hufbauer, Shelton-Erb & Starr, supra note 14, at 61.
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projects that are open to foreign bids. 28 Under U.S. law, only GATT
members that are signatories of the subsidies code are entitled to the
injury test on subsidized exports to the United States.29 These depar-
tures from unconditional MFN were designed to enhance discipline and
thereby promote trade. They provided a mechanism for pressuring free
riders and foot draggers that sought to lower standards.30
Other departures from unconditional MFN do not necessarily pro-
mote trade or enhance discipline. Regional groupings such as free trade
areas and customs unions divert trade as well as create it. GATT mem-
bers often abuse Article XXIV, which permits regional groupings.31
Article XXIV lays out specific requirements which members seldom
meet in practice, although the recent U.S.-Canadian agreement may be
an exception.3 2 A further proliferation of regional groupings would set
precedents for more special deals, fragment the trading system, and
damage the interest of non-participants.
Some scholars have suggested that the increasing number and types
of exceptions to unconditional MFN have weakened, perhaps irrepara-
bly, the role of the GATT and the very model of liberal world trade.33
However, these fears need not lead to scrapping the GATT or multilat-
eral trade policy. While the GATT undoubtedly needs reform,3 4 the
overall multilateral structure survives despite its current limitations.
The GATT also provides a conceptual starting point for any trade nego-
tiations incorporating multilateralism and MFN. A policy of pursuing
bilateral agreements may shift that presumption with potentially disas-
trous effects on the world economy and political cooperation.
28. Keohane, supra note 15, at 19. See G. HUFBAUER &J. SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 120-23 (1984). See also Jones, The GAT'-MFN System and the
European Community as International Frameworks for the Regulation of Economic Activity: The
Removal of Barriers to Trade in Government Procurement, 8 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 53, 63
(1984).
29. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982).
30. Keohane, supra note 15, at 12-13.
31. GATT, supra note 1, at art. XXIV. For a discussion of article XXIV and the
difficulties it creates for the GATT multilateral framework, seeJ. JACKSON, supra note
12, at 575-623. See also K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 274-96 (1970); Baucus, supra note 2, at 19-21.
32. For an historical analysis of the relationship between limited agreements and
multilateral agreements see Diebold, The History and the Issues, in BILATERALISM, MUL-
TILATERALISM AND CANADA IN U.S. TRADE POLICY (W. Diebold ed. 1988).
33. Hufbauer, Shelton-Erb & Starr, supra note 14, at 91-93. Jackson has termed
the weakening of unconditional MFN a "crisis of confidence in the international trade
system." Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 93 (1978).
34. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
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M. Generic Problems with Bilateral Free Trade Agreements3 5
Bilateral free trade agreements are justified only in special cases. For
example, the U.S.-Israeli free trade agreement has outstanding political
implications.3 6 The U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement and the Euro-
pean Community may be special cases in light of the proximity and
interdependence of the member-States.3 7 In his 1988 State of the
Union address, President Reagan spoke of including Mexico in a North
American trade accord.3 8 Beyond these examples, further bilaterals
would seriously undermine the world trading system.
A. Historical Antecedents
Advocates of more bilaterals in the Administration and on Capitol Hill
would do well to remember the lessons of the 1930s. When the GATT
was signed, the world had barely receded from the dire consequences of
trade discrimination. In the wake of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff3 9 and sub-
sequent retaliation, 40 many countries tried to protect their own econo-
mies by establishing bilateral or regional agreements. 4 1 Such "beggar-
thy-neighbor" strategies spread, deepening the world's economic
decline.4 2 The lessons of the 1930s teach that bilateral agreements fail
as mechanisms of international economic regulation, 43 impoverishing
the international community for the short term benefit of a few States.4 4
35. The treatment of bilateral agreements in this section focuses solely on
bilateral free trade agreements and not on bilateral negotiations generally. For a
more general discussion, see Diebold, supra note 32.
36. C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 94.
37. See M. SCHNIZNER, M. LIEBRENZ & K. KUBIN, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 389
(1985).
38. See Diebold, supra note 32, at 160. See also Baucus, supra note 2, at 17-18.
39. Signed in 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff contributed significantly to the
Great Depression. See Cooper, Trade Policy and Foreign Policy, in UNIVERSITY OF MICHI-
GAN CONFERENCE ON U.S. TRADE POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 2 (Mar.
28-29 1985).
40. In the months following the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, twenty-five
countries retaliated with higher tariffs. C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 16.
41. John Maynard Keynes described the situation for the United States as a
period requiring a policy "to maintain employment at home by forcing sales on for-
eign markets and restricting purchases, which, if successful, will merely shift the
problem of unemployment to the neighbor which is worsted in the struggle." J. M.
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 382-83 (1936),
quoted in G. CURZON, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL DIPLOMACY 28 (1965).
42. C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 16. See also Robinson, Beggar-Thy-
Neighbor Remedies for Unemployment, in READINGS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 393-407 (1949) (offering ajustification for such trade behavior).
43. See H.W. ARUNDT, THE ECONOMIC LESSONS OF THE NINETEEN-THIRTIES 17
(1944).
44. C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 16. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS, COMMER-
CIAL POLICY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD: INTERNATIONAL PROPOSALS AND NATIONAL POL-
ICIES 70-71 (1942).
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B. Economic Considerations
The arguments against bilateralism are both economic and political. In
short, a succession of bilateral trade agreements will create resentment
and inefficiency, increase bureaucracy, and send unwise signals to other
nations. 4 5
From an economic perspective, bilateralism places obstacles in the
path of free movement of goods and capital.4 6 The desire to strike
political balance between nations takes precedence over consideration
of comparative resource endowments. Therefore, a bilateral system of
trade prevents the efficient use of the world's resources. 4 7
Trade policy founded on a series of bilateral agreements creates an
environment of unpredictability and discourages trade-related business
investment. The perception that bilaterals expand markets for busi-
nesses in the participating States is often illusory or at best short term;
the conclusion of a second or third discriminatory bilateral agreement
necessarily disappoints expectations and opportunities created by the
first.48 If other nations follow the U.S. lead and negotiate bilateral
agreements offering mutually incompatible privileges, predictability and
stability would be destroyed for all States.
The experience of the 1930s shows how difficult it becomes for
businesses to bear the risks of trade-related investment when changes in
trade protection become less predictable. Heavy losses in output and
employment occur when investment is reduced and directed into less
rewarding projects. Moreover, trade policy conflicts resulting in a
decline in trade and world output can provide fertile ground for political
radicals to seize the reins of government.4 9
C. Political Considerations
Inextricably linked to the economic concerns are political factors which
argue against a bilateral approach to international trade. Friction may
develop between parties to a bilateral agreement, 50 especially when a
party to a bilateral decides to open up trade with a third State.
The essence of bilaterals is that a State plays favorites. Tensions
with third parties are bound to develop because of the discriminatory
treatment, 5 1 producing resentment and distrust in the excluded
45. C. AHO & M. LEvINSON, supra note 4, at 94.
46. See R. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 13 (1956).
47. Id.
48. Id.; Ellis, Bilateralism and the Future of International Trade, in READINGS IN THE
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 42, at 415-47.
49. For a detailed analysis together with a dramatic chart of the downward spiral
of trade, see C. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 171-72 (1973).
50. See Diebold, supra note 32, at 87.
51. In 1919, the Tariff Commission concluded that:
a policy of special arrangements . . . leads to troublesome complications.
Whether as regards our reciprocity treaties or as regards our interpretation
of the most-favored-nation clause, the separate and individual treatment of
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nations. 52 The effect on developing nations could be particularly acute.
For left-of-center politicians in many third world States, discriminatory
bilateral arrangements may well smack of colonialism.5 3 The develop-
ment of a globally consistent, stable system of trade requires effective
equality of rights and obligations among States, which can be ensured
only by general acceptance of the principle of nondiscrimination, other-
wise known as most-favored-nation treatment. This principle mobilizes
large nations to support the aspirations of small nations to be treated
equally. In no other way can the sovereign equality of nations which
differ enormously in size and power be realized, or even approximated.
The United States, Japan and the European Community-the major
pillars of the trading system-cannot afford to be in rival blocs.
Although the United States has expressed some frustration with the
European Community for slowing the multilateral process and with
Japan over market access, Western cooperation remains important for
strategic and security reasons and must not be undermined. The best
message of alliance cohesion the Western nations can send to Eastern
bloc nations is a flourishing, unified and nondiscriminatory trading sys-
tem. A fragmented trading system with friction and discrimination
would send precisely the wrong signal.
Aside from international politics, domestic political considerations
also argue against a policy of bilateralism. A strategy of bilateralism
would necessarily require that Congress play a major role in formulating
trade policy. Consider how members of Congress will be whipsawed by
short term national interest as well as sectoral interests. Legislative
action on separate agreements opens up the possibility that trade will be
used as a weapon of foreign policy against countries failing to follow
U.S. foreign policy initiatives. Some legislators, pressured by special
interest groups, may seek to discriminate in the application of domestic
law. In sum, a bilateral strategy would raise trade policy from "low
level" to "high level" foreign policy. The new Secretary of State, James
A. Baker III, would end up spending more time on the balance of trade,
leaving him less time to spend on the balance of terror. That would be a
gross misallocation of resources.
Regardless of the perspective, bilaterals or like-minded groupings
are an inferior alternative when compared with multilateral liberaliza-
tion on a nondiscriminatory basis.5 4 Politically, bilaterals discriminate
and create foreign policy problems. Economically, bilaterals fragment
the international trading system. The United States needs to generate
trade surpluses of up to $50 billion to service its trillion dollar foreign
each case tends to create misunderstanding and friction with countries which,
though supposed to be not concerned, yet are in reality much concerned.
Quoted in W. Diebold, supra note 32, at 3.
52. C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 94.
53. For an extended discussion of the drawbacks, see C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra
note 17, at ch. 7.
54. See C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 17.
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debt in the 1990s.5 5 Without an open multilateral trading system, that
will be next to impossible.
IV. Drawbacks of a Bilateral with Japan
Despite the arguments against negotiating a series of bilateral agree-
ments, policy-makers persist in proposing an accord withJapan. 56 They
base these proposals either on false premises or a misreading of the
potential gains by paying insufficient attention to the negative
consequences.
A. Tactical Considerations
Proponents of a bilateral trade agreement with Japan cite the corrosive
effect that bilateral disputes have had on the U.S.-Japanese relationship
and the ineffectiveness of the piecemeal approach to solving these dis-
putes. 5 7 There are, however, several barriers to a U.S.-Japan accord.
Before such an agreement can be effectuated, the trade policy process in
the United States must be internally reformed to establish and highlight
trade priorities. Otherwise, the U.S. will not overcome the disputes with
Japan through a bilateral agreement. Moreover, the U.S. should not
assume-even if it did change its policy-that Japan would be any more
able or willing to accede to U.S. demands on contentious issues, such as
agriculture and construction policy.58 Multilateral, rather than bilateral,
pressure would be more effective and more palatable politically within
Japan.
A bilateral trade agreement with Japan would be a mistaken strate-
gic move in U.S. trade policy. Foremost, it would tie the hands of Amer-
ican trade negotiators. The launch of the Uruguay Round at Punte del
Este demonstrated the importance of coalition building in future trade
negotiations. Since coalitions shift from issue to issue, it is better to
retain the flexibility to form different coalitions than to limit options by
joining a bilateral with another major pillar of the trading system. For
example, the United States might someday wish to join forces with the
European Community in a multilateral forum on the issue of market
access to Japan, but may later have to join with Japan to ensure that the
European Community does not use the 1992 effort as a means to dis-
criminate against outside interests.
Furthermore, if the United States does enter into a bilateral trade
agreement, it is not at all obvious that Japan is the most appropriate
partner. Senator Baucus prefers a bilateral with Japan,59 while Con-
gressman Gephardt has proposed that the European Community should
55. For references and an extended discussion of the problems of servicing U.S.
foreign debt, see C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
56. See, e.g., Baucus, supra note 2, at 8-17; Groping for a Practical New Order in World
Trade, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1987, at 30.
57. See Baucus, supra note 2, at 12.
58. See C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 85.
59. See Baucus, supra note 2, at 8-17.
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be the object of U.S. bilateral initiatives. 60 Senator Bradley favors a
plurilateral trade agreement with the Pacific Rim nations.6 1 Who is
going to decide and on what basis?
Granted, new approaches to trade policy in a highly pluralistic
world may bring needed pressure on free riders and foot draggers. The
preferred approach, however, is to remain within the GATT and
develop the conditional MFN approach as was done with the Tokyo
Round, where only signatories to the new codes received the benefits of
abiding by the additional discipline.6 2 Since the free riders and foot
draggers will vary from issue to issue, conditional MFN allows for
greater flexibility.
B. Practical Considerations
Beyond these tactical issues, there are several practical reasons to reject
a bilateral trade accord with Japan. The drawbacks are manifold. First,
negotiation of a traditional free trade agreement is too modest a goal.
Even if the agreement covered tariffs and non-tariff barriers or included
such new issues as trade in services, intellectual property and foreign
investment, the two nations would have failed to address significant
problems. The most difficult problems the United States has withJapan,
including the distribution system and cultural preferences, are not sus-
ceptible to negotiation by formula or by drafting new trade rules.
Second, the concessionary nature of negotiations requires that the
United States "give up" something in order to receive something out of
an agreement. This may mean dismantling import restraints on steel,
autos, semiconductors, machine tools, textiles and the other barriers
that remain to Japanese exports to the United States. The U.S. Con-
gress might have to construct an institutional apparatus for dispute set-
tlement that would allow frictions with Japan to skirt U.S. trade remedy
laws. Particular interest groups and members of Congress are likely to
think that this would give up too much control.
Third, while the new U.S.-Canadian bilateral is a good agreement, it
still failed to address many of the central difficulties of trade between the
two countries. The accord does not address subsidies, trade remedy
actions, government procurement, or intellectual property. 63 This
agreement took almost two years to negotiate, and the talks came peril-
ously close to collapse on several occasions. Moreover, even after Can-
ada and the United States reached an agreement and the U.S. Congress
ratified the accord, the Canadian public nearly rejected the agreement
by coming close to voting out the conservative Mulrooney government
responsible for its negotiation. Indeed, the agreement became the cen-
60. Address by Representative Richard Gephardt, "United States Trade Policy
for the 1990s," George Washington University Law Society (Oct. 12, 1988).
61. Address by Senator Bill Bradley, New York Economic Club (Dec. 8, 1988).
62. See Hufbauer, Shelton-Erb & Starr, supra note 14, at 61.
63. For an assessment of unfinished business and for an analysis of how the bilat-
eral agreement might blend with the multilateral talks, see Diebold, supra note 32.
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tral issue of Canada's national campaign.64 Before launching another
bilateral, it would be wise to wait and see how the agreement with Can-
ada works out.
Fourth, since both the U.S. and Japan have substantial trade inter-
ests and business investments in other countries, establishment of a new
bilateral would divert trade and investment. This would result in eco-
nomic inefficiency, raising consumer costs and altering sourcing pat-
terns for firms with subsidiary operations in other countries. The extent
of the net inefficiencies created would depend upon the balance
between trade creation and trade diversion.65 Nonetheless, some con-
sumers, affected multinational corporations, and third-country business
interests would have cause to complain.
Fifth, even the onset of negotiations between the U.S. and Japan
would cause other countries to change their behavior-and not neces-
sarily in ways conducive to reaching a multilateral agreement. Other
Asian countries, for example, would likely clamor for similar negotia-
tions with either Japan or the United States (Asia's major trading part-
ners), or both. The United States lacks the capability to conduct a series
of bilaterals simultaneously, but could not afford to defer resolution of
these requests until the U.S.-Japanese negotiations were completed.
Finally, the U.S. must carefully compare the costs of failure with the
likely gains from any agreement. As any negotiations of this type pro-
ceed, the negotiators must realize that if they fail it is often impossible to
return to the status quo ante. Under such circumstances, negotiators are
hard pressed to come up with an agreement, no matter how bad or how
unworkable. The gains of a bilateral accord withJapan are unlikely to be
so great as to warrant risking the trading system as it now stands.
V. A Strategy for the New President
A. Reform the GATT
A great deal needs to be done to reform the international trading sys-
tem. The GATT is one of the three major international institutions
originally designed to help stabilize the world economy in the post-
World War II environment. The GATT, however, does not have the
authority in trade that the International Monetary Fund has in finance or
the World Bank has in development. 66 The GATT is an administrative
agency with a professional staff of fewer than 200 people (compared
with 1700 for the IMF and over 6000 at the World Bank).6 7 The defi-
ciencies of the GATT, or more accurately of the GATT system, have
64. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1988, at A5, col. 1.
65. For the classic statement of the concepts of trade diversion and trade crea-
tion, seeJ. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950).
66. C. AHO & M. LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 87.
67. Id.
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become apparent in recent years. 68
The GATT needs several institutional reforms. The adjudication of
disputes and enforcement of rules needs strengthening, 69 and rules on
subsidies and unfair trade need revamping.70 The GATT must become
more of a forum for the mediation and reconciliation of trade disputes
not explicitly covered by existing rules. 7' The GATT should aim at
responding to problems as they emerge. These reforms share the com-
mon goal of heightening the respect and authority of the GATT in the
international community. International policy makers can make and
implement the changes detailed above through multilateral negotiations
already in progress. The Uruguay Round is currently addressing many
of these issues.
Beyond institutional reforms, the GATT mirrors the cooperation
that its members invest. Unfortunately, international cooperation on
trade may be at its lowest level since World War II. Political will is a
necessity in all countries-but especially in the United States. Ensuring
success of the Uruguay Round, therefore, should be the first trade prior-
ity of the new President. Although working for change will be arduous,
the stakes are too high not to continue trying.
7 2
B. Opening Markets and Deterring Barriers Through Retaliation
U.S. trade policy should emphasize the opening of foreign markets over
the protection of domestic industries. The United States should pursue
an aggressive policy of deterrence and retaliation toward the end of
strengthening adherence to internationally established rules of trade. 73
Discussions of international trade invariably underestimate the
importance of deterrence, although it is elemental in understanding
strategic relations among nations. Some advocates of free trade mistak-
enly believe that tolerating offensive behavior without retaliation is an
admirable form of self-restraint. Though tolerance may signal U.S.
commitment to a liberal trading order, it also allows other countries to
infringe upon trading rules without prosecution. Yet, reluctance to
retaliate is enshrined in American trade law. Where the U.S. does
impose sanctions, the intent is protectionist rather than market-opening.
Retaliation, however, far from being something to avoid at all costs, is a
necessary part of a self-regulating world system of free trade. Unfortu-
nately, under current GATT procedures, the probability that a country
illegally interfering with trade will suffer major economic harm from
retaliatory actions is extremely low. The deterrent effect is negligible.
68. For an excellent treatment of the deficiencies of the GAIT system, see M.
CAMPS & W. DIEBOLD, THE NEW MULTILATERALISM 37-72 (1986).
69. Id at 43-44.
70. Id at 40.
71. Id. at 49-55.
72. For an analysis of the difficulties, see C. AHO &J. ARONSON, supra note 17.
73. See generally I. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS: SYSTEM UNDER STRESS
(1986).
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The new President should retaliate against foreign barriers that
clearly violate internationally defined rules of the world trading system.
In each instance of retaliation, the United States should define clearly
and state publicly what actions on the offending nation's part will cause
the U.S. to lift the retaliatory measures. In addition, retaliation should
occur only within the realm of international trade, to make it clear that
the United States has no desire to allow trade disputes to poison other
aspects of international relations. Ideally, trading partners would be
confident that eliminating the objectionable practice would end U.S.
interference with their exports.
Unfortunately, current U.S. laws cloud the potential clarity of a
trade policy employing retaliation. Individual companies and industries
may file for import relief with little cost and no risk, giving them an inor-
dinate influence in setting U.S. trade policy and stripping American dip-
lomats of much of their bargaining leverage. A trading partner has little
incentive to compromise to avert retaliation when it knows that any indi-
vidual American company can still obtain sanctions against it. The
deterrent effect of calibrated, government-initiated retaliation is lost.
Some of the current U.S. laws allowing private actions should be traded
away at the Uruguay Round and replaced by a specific policy of retalia-
tion, granting the President the flexibility to impose and withdraw retali-
atory penalties.
The 1988 trade bill has already taken some steps in reforming U.S.
law and policy, emphasizing market-opening retaliation over market-
closing protection. The publication of foreign trade barriers to U.S.
exports, as required by law, and the occasional public disclosure of lists
of retaliation targets may also deter the further spread of barriers. If
new barriers are erected, the United States could publicly identify some
of the items on the list of retaliatory targets in order to mobilize the
public sector in the offending country.74
Applying deterrence to trade policy does carry with it the risks of
escalation, retaliation, and counter-retaliation. Careful selection of
targets for retaliation can reduce some of these risks. Such targetting
requires a competence and an objectivity on the part of officials in the
executive branch, both in choosing barriers to retaliate against and in
selecting the targets of retaliation. Although it offers one possible
means of maintaining a self-enforcing system of international trading
rules, this approach requires the adoption of well defined rules. The
ongoing multilateral talks under the auspices of the GATT provide the
best opportunity to improve the rules that govern trade.
Opening new markets, as the supporters of bilateral agreements
suggest, is a crucial step, but it is a step best taken within the multilateral
trade framework. President Bush should initiate reforms of the GATT
74. M. Levinson, Trade Policy or Trade Strategy (Working Paper for a Council on
Foreign Relations study group on the Economic Choices Confronting the Next Presi-
dent, New York (May 10, 1988) (unpublished manuscript).
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through the Uruguay Round and promote a strong policy of retaliation
against GATT violators. These efforts risk failure, however, unless he
also can successfully manage domestic trade politics.
C. Managing the Domestic Trade Front
A major lesson of the past decade is that it is not enough for the Presi-
dent to negotiate freer trade with other countries. He must also attend
to the domestic front on trade matters. He must do more to involve the
private sector and Congress in making trade policy. He must mobilize
private sector support and keep Congress constantly apprised of the
negotiations. He must convince Congress and the public that he is
according trade matters their due priority and is protecting American
interests.
A frank policy of retaliation against foreign barriers would provide
visible evidence to the domestic political arena that the U.S. government
is vigorously asserting the country's interest in trade matters. This will
help establish presidential credibility on trade, greatly diminishing pro-
tectionist pressures on the domestic front.
The new administration must continue to push hard for visible signs
of progress. Unless a new multilateral accord resolves basic issues of
disagreement, trade frictions with Japan and the European Community
are likely to escalate in the decade ahead. Yet the United States should
not succumb to pressures to resolve trade frustrations through numer-
ous bilateral accords. The break-up of the world trading system into
regional blocs, each based upon separate bilateral agreements, is
directly contrary to the long-established U.S. goal of liberalizing the
international flow of goods and services.
Perhaps most importantly, the new President must lead the formu-
lation of American trade policy. The political structure for handling
trade issues requires that the President take the lead in order to protect
members of Congress from intense pressure to save local factories and
mines from import competition. When the chief executive fails to
assume the role of advocate and lightning rod on trade matters, as was
the case throughout the Reagan years, the protectionist pressures may
be impossible for Congress to withstand.
Conclusion
As the new U.S. administration struggles to find its way on trade policy,
the world will await nervously. George Bush will face enormous pres-
sure to abandon the United States' traditional commitment to the multi-
lateral process and instead to cut bilateral deals. The President must
stand firm, supporting the multilateral process and retaliating against
those States that break internationally accepted rules. Trade can no
longer be treated as a stepchild of domestic economic policy at home
and of foreign policy abroad. It must be a continuing priority.
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